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(57)	 ABSTRACT
A monitoring system and methods are provided for a distrib-
uted and recoverable digital control system. The monitoring
system generally comprises two independent monitoring
planes within the control system. The first monitoring plane is
internal to the computing units in the control system, and the
second monitoring plane is external to the computing units.
The internal first monitoring plane includes two in-line moni-
tors. The first internal monitor is a self-checking, lock-step-
processing monitor with integrated rapid recovery capability.
The second internal monitor includes one or more reason-
ableness monitors, which compare actual effector position
with commanded effector position. The external second
monitor plane includes two monitors. The first external moni-
tor includes a pre-recovery computing monitor, and the sec-
ond external monitor includes a post recovery computing
monitor. Various methods for implementing the monitoring
functions are also disclosed.
18 Claims, 7 Drawing Sheets
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1
MONITORING SYSTEM AND METHODS FOR
A DISTRIBUTED AND RECOVERABLE
DIGITAL CONTROL SYSTEM
This application claims the benefit of priority to U.S. Pro-
visional Application No. 60/705,843, filed on Aug. 5, 2005,
which is incorporated herein by reference. The present appli-
cation is related to U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/381,
608, filed May 4, 2006, and to U.S. patent application Ser. No.
11/381,652, filed May 4, 2006, both of which are incorpo-
rated herein by reference.
The U.S. Government may have certain rights in the
present invention as provided for by the terms of Contract No.
CRA NCC-1-393 with NASA.
BACKGROUND TECHNOLOGY
Computers have been used in digital control systems in a
variety of applications, such as in industrial, aerospace, medi-
cal, scientific research, and other fields. In such control sys-
tems, it is important to maintain the integrity of the data
produced by a computer. In conventional control systems, a
computing unit for a plant is typically designed such that the
resulting closed loop system exhibits stability, low-frequency
command tracking, low-frequency disturbance rejection, and
high-frequency noise attenuation. The "plant" can be any
object, process, or other parameter capable of being con-
trolled, such as an aircraft, spacecraft, medical equipment,
electrical power generation, industrial automation, valve,
boiler, actuator, or other device. A control effector is used to
provoke a response by the plant. For example, when the plant
is an aircraft, control effectors may be in the form of flight
control surfaces such as rudders, ailerons, and/or elevators.
Various types of failures or faults may be encountered by
conventional computing units found in control systems. A
"hard fault" is a fault condition typically caused by a penna-
nent failure of the analog or digital circuitry. For digital cir-
cuitry, a "soft fault" is typically caused by transient phenom-
ena that may affect some digital circuit computing elements
resulting in computation disruption, but does not permanently
damage or alter the subsequent operation of the circuitry.
Soft faults maybe caused by electromagnetic fields created
by high-frequency signals propagating through the comput-
ing system. Soft faults may also result from spurious intense
electromagnetic signals, such as those caused by lightning
that induce electrical transients on system lines and data buses
which propagate to internal digital circuitry setting latches
into erroneous states. In addition to lightning, other elements
of the electromagnetic environment (EME) such as high-
intensity radiated fields (HIRE), radio communications, radar
pulses, and the intense fields associated with electromagnetic
pulses (EMP) may also cause soft faults. Further, high-energy
atomic particles from a variety of sources (e.g., atmospheric
neutrons, cosmic radiation, weapon detonation, etc.) may
deposit sufficient energy in the bulk semiconductor material
of a digital device to set electronic circuits into erroneous
states. With the advent of smaller integrated circuits running
at high speeds, soft faults are becoming more common such
as in the radiation environment encountered by aircraft trav-
eling at high altitudes. In such an environment, computing
circuits containing state-of-the-art digital devices may be
more susceptible to failure.
In conventional control systems, various forms of redun-
dancy have been used in an attempt to reduce the effects of
faults in critical systems. Multiple processing units, for
example, may be used within a computing system. In a system
with three processing units, for example, if one processor is
2
determined to be experiencing a fault, that processor may be
isolated and/or shut down. The fault may be corrected by
correct data (such as the current values of various control state
variables) being transmitted (or "transfused") from the
5 remaining processors to the isolated unit. If the faults in the
isolated unit are corrected, the processing unit may be re-
introduced to the computing system along with the other two
processing units.
Dissimilar computational redundancy is used to prevent
to the introduction of generic faults in control system architec-
tures. Generic faults refer to common errors in system redun-
dancies. Such errors can occur in the design and development
of the hardware and software elements within general pur-
pose computers that are used in control system architectures.
is As such, dissimilar computational redundancy would entail
each redundant hardware element using a dissimilar micro-
processor and each redundant microprocessor executing soft-
ware (e.g., operating system, application, etc.) that was devel-
20 
oped using a different programming language.
Other methods that have been used to help ensure the
continued operation of control systems include the use of
dissimilar technology, distributed computation redundancy,
equalization, and mid-value voting. Each of these methods,
25 however, generally requires at least one processing unit to
remain operational at all times to preserve state variables.
While the control systems may remain operational if all but
one of the processing units experience a soft fault and the
correctly-operating unit can be identified, the control system
30 will not operate properly if all of the processors simulta-
neously experience soft faults. Similarly, if a lone properly-
operating unit cannot be identified within the system, the
system will not recover, as there would be no identifiable
operating unit with correct values for all of the state variables
35 to be transfused to the remaining units. In addition, because of
the transfusion of state variables from other processing units,
the system recovery may be relatively slow. It may therefore
take an extended period of time for all processing units within
the system to resume normal operation. In the meantime,
40 redundant control is undesirably lost or degraded.
In the aerospace field, digital flight control systems are
frequently interposed between the pilot and the flight control
surfaces of an aircraft. Such systems may include fly-by-wire,
auto-pilot, and auto-land systems. In a fly-by-wire system, in
45 lieu of pilot controls being mechanically coupled (e.g., via
cables or hydraulics) to the various primary flight control
surfaces of the aircraft (such as the ailerons, elevators, and
rudder), the position and movements of a pilot's controls are
electronically read by sensors and transmitted to a computing
50 system. The computing system typically sends electronic
control signals to actuators of various types that are coupled
to the primary flight control surfaces of the aircraft. The
actuators are typically configured to move one or more con-
trol surfaces according to inputs provided by the pilot, or in
55 response to feedback measured by a sensor on the aircraft.
Failure of the control system could thus have catastrophic
effects on the aircraft. Similarly, industrial, medical, or other
systems may be gravely affected by certain control system
failures.
60 In conventional flight control system (FCS) architectures,
recovery from soft faults of FCS architectural elements, par-
ticularly in the flight control computer, is either not possible,
has to resort to recovery attempts after a grace period of time,
or requires recycling of power such as rebooting the com-
65 puter. Any of these circumstances can impact the mean time
between unscheduled removals (MTBUR) negatively. In
addition, tight tolerance monitoring has been dependant on
US 7,765,427 B2
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synchronous operations for tight tracking of redundant ele- 	 Further details related to the monitoring system and tech-
ments, and has been relatively federated and not easily scale- 	 niques of the invention are described hereafter.
able.	 In the following description, various embodiments of the
High integrity digital flight control systems usually require 	 present invention may be described herein in terms of various
incorporation of redundant elements to achieve required reli- 5 architecture elements and processing steps. It should be
ability. Management of systems to provide maximum theo- 	 appreciated that such elements may be realized by any num-
retically possible availability of the redundant elements in the 	 ber of hardware or structural components configured to per-
presence of soft faults is difficult to achieve without requiring 	 form specified operations. For purposes of illustration only,
close synchronization of the computing elements or other 	 exemplary embodiments of the present invention will fre-
technically difficult monitoring mechanisms. 	 io quently be described herein in connection with aircraft avi-
onics. The invention is not so limited, however, and the con-
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 	 cepts and devices disclosed herein may be used in any control
environment. Further, it should be noted that although various
Features of the present invention will become apparent to 	 components may be coupled or connected to other compo-
those skilled in the art from the following description with 15 nents within exemplary system architectures, such connec-
reference to the drawings. Understanding that the drawings 	 tions and couplings can be realized by direct connection
depict only typical embodiments of the invention and are not 	 between components, or by connection through other com-
therefore to be considered limiting in scope, the invention will 	 ponents and devices located therebetween. The following
be described with additional specificity aid detail through the 	 detailed description is, therefore, not to be taken in a limiting
use of the accompanying drawings, in which: 	 20 sense.
FIG. 1 is a schematic depiction of a digital control system 	 According to various exemplary embodiments of the
that can employ the monitoring features of the invention 	 invention, a control system architecture suitably includes suf-
according to one embodiment; 	 ficient computation redundancy and control command man-
FIG. 2 is a schematic depiction of a time magnitude moni- 	 agement to either isolate or recover a faulted processor, or to
tor that can be used in a digital control system; 	 25 recover all processing units of the redundant system without
FIG. 3 is a block diagram of an exemplary actuator com-	 adverse effects. Computational redundancy may be provided
mand selection and lane command monitor employing rap- 	 with multiple processors or processing units within a com-
idly recoverable computing elements; 	 puter or computing platform. In addition to isolating and
FIG. 4 is a block diagram of a servo monitor that can be 	 recovering from internal faults, various embodiments allow
used in a digital control system; 	 30 processing units to detect faults in other system elements such
FIG. 5 is a block diagram of an actuator control unit moni- 	 as sensors, adaptors, actuators and/or effectors. Further
tor that can be used in a digital control system; 	 embodiments may also include one or more actuator adaptor
FIG. 6 is a block diagram of an actuator control unit com- 	 units, that through the detection of adverse data errors, detect
puting monitor that can be used in a digital control system;	 faults in other system components (that are in addition to the
and	 35 processing units) and issue discrete instructions to trigger a
FIG. 7 is a block diagram of a post recovery computing 	 recovery.
monitor that can be used in a digital control system.	 An exemplary control system architecture suitably
includes multiple processors, each of which is configured for
DETAILED DESCRIPTION	 rapid recovery from various faults. The term "rapid recovery"
40 indicates that recovery may occur in a very short amount of
The present invention relates to a monitoring system and 	 time. To maintain the operation of a control system, it is
methods for a distributed and recoverable digital control sys- 	 generally desirable that a recovery from a soft fault takes
tem. The monitoring system generally comprises two inde- 	 place within about I to 2 computing frames. As used herein,
pendent monitoring planes within the control system. The 	 a "computing frame" is the time needed for a particular pro-
first monitoring plane is internal to the computing units in the 45 cessing unit to perform a repetitive task of a computation,
control system. The second monitoring plane is external to 	 e.g., the tasks that need to be calculated continuously to
the computing units in the control system.	 maintain the operation of the controlled plant. In some
The internal first monitoring plane includes two in-line 	 embodiments, processor recovery is performed within about
monitors. The first monitor is a self-checking, lock-step-pro- 	 I computing frame and redundancy recovery is performed
cessing monitor with integrated rapid recovery capability. 50 within about I or 2 computing frames, or otherwise in a short
The second monitor includes one or more reasonableness 	 enough time period so as to have only minimal effects, if any,
monitors, which compare actual effector position with com-	 on system performance.
manded effector position.	 The ability of a processor to initiate recovery from a soft
The external second monitoring plane includes two moni- 	 fault allows various embodiments of the present invention to
tors. The first monitor includes a pre-recovery computing 55 aid in the recovery of the system as a whole. In addition, soft
monitor, and the second monitor includes a post recovery 	 faults may be detected in the same computing frame or within
computing monitor. Once the computational elements have 	 several frames in which the faults occur. In embodiments
been deemed to be computing errant outputs, a rapid recovery	 where faults are detected within a single computing frame
is triggered. The monitoring of that errant computational 	 each processor need only store control and logic state variable
element then follows a post recovery algorithm to determine 6o data for the immediately preceding frame for use in recovery
if the recovery was successful. If the recovery was successful 	 purposes, which may take place essentially instantaneously.
the outputs of the recovered element are re-enabled to be 	 Accordingly, the dependence of each component upon other
blended with the remaining system outputs in computing the 	 redundant components is suitably reduced.
blended system output. If the recovery was not successful the	 Instructions for carrying out the various methods, process
recovered computational element is eliminated from the out- 65 tasks, calculations, control functions, and the generation of
put blending function computation until the system is 	 signals and other data used in the operation of the system of
restarted.	 the invention are implemented, in some embodiments, in
US 7,765,427 B2
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software programs, firmware, or computer readable instruc-	 ACUs also perform monitoring of actuator command lanes,
tions. These instructions are typically stored on any appropri- 	 data concentration, and initiation of a selective and isolated
ate computer readable medium used for storage of computer 	 recovery trigger of each monitored application. The ACUs
readable instructions or data structures. Such computer read- 	 can also be redundant per control axis. Although control
able media can be any available media that can be acces sed by 5 system 100 is shown with four ACUs, a varying number of
a general purpose or special purpose computer or processor, 	 ACUs can be employed depending upon system require-
or any programmable logic device. 	 ments. For example, in some embodiments three or more
By way of example, and not limitation, such computer 	 ACUs can be employed in a control system according to the
readable media can include floppy disks, hard disks, ROM, 	 invention.
flash memory ROM, nonvolatile ROM, EEPROM, RAM, io Each ACU 116, 118, 120, and 122 can be in operative
CD-ROM, DVD-ROM, or other optical disk storage, mag- 	 communication with a respective one of a smart actuator 124,
netic disk storage, or other magnetic storage devices, or any 	 126, 128, and 130. An actuator is made "smart" when an
other medium that can be used to carry or store desired pro- 	 electronics module such as an electronic interface unit (EIU)
gram code means in the form of computer executable instruc- 	 is added to the basic actuator. The smart actuators used in the
tions or data structures. When information is transferred or 15 control system can be dual-channel, fail-passive, electrome-
provided over a network or another communications connec- 	 chanical actuators, which contain two independent computa-
tion (either hardwired, wireless, or a combination of hard- 	 tional lanes. The smart actuators receive actuator position
wired or wireless) to a computer, the computer properly views 	 command signals from the ACUs. The smart actuators also
the connection as a computer readable medium. Thus, any 	 determine validity of commands from the computing unit
such connection is properly termed a computer readable 20 based on command validity flags and activity monitoring. The
medium. Combinations of the above are also included within 	 smart actuators 124, 126, 128, and 130 are configured to
the scope of computer readable media. Computer executable 	 provide feedback to the respective ACU 116, 118, 120, and
instructions comprise, for example, instructions and data	 122 related to actuator position information.
which cause a general purpose computer, special purpose	 The smart actuators 124,126, 128, and 130 can optionally
computer, or special purpose processing device to perform a 25 be in operative communication with a respective servo or
certain function or group of functions. 	 actuator device such as hydraulic actuators 132, 134, 136, and
The system of the invention will also be described in the	 138. The hydraulic actuators 132, 134, 136, and 138 can be
general context of computer readable instructions, such as 	 respectively coupled to various control effectors 140, 141,
program modules, being executed by a processor. Generally,	 142, and 143 such as, for example, various primary flight
program modules include routines, programs, objects, data so control surfaces of an aircraft (e.g., rudders, ailerons, and/or
components, data structures, algorithms, etc. that perform	 elevators). The control effectors 140-143 are configured to
particular tasks or implement particular abstract data types. 	 provide feedback to the respective ACU 116, 118, 120, and
Computer executable instructions, associated data structures, 	 122 related to surface position information.
and program modules represent examples of a program code 	 As depicted in FIG. 1, the computing units 112 and 114
means for executing steps of the methods disclosed herein. 35 receive data inputs from sensor sets 150,152, and 154, which
The particular sequence of such executable instructions or 	 can include air data, inertial data, or commands from an
associated data structures represents examples of correspond- 	 operator (e.g., pilot controls, etc.). The sensor sets can include
ing acts for implementing the functions described in such	 any number of gyroscopes, vehicle position sensors, airflow
steps.	 sensors, temperature sensors, and/or other sensing devices as
Referring now to FIG. 1, an exemplary scaleable architec-  40 may be appropriate for the particular implementation. A data
ture of a digital control system 100 that can employ the	 concentrator 156, 158, and 160 with a single lane can be
monitoring system and method of the invention includes a 	 implemented between each sensor set 150, 152, 154 and
first computing unit 112 and a second computing unit 114. 	 computing units 112 and 114. The data concentrators suitably
The computing units 112 and 114 can be any digital control 	 receive and concentrate data from the sensors to provide an
device such as a digital computer or processor, and provide 45 interface to computing units 112 and 114 as appropriate. The
for redundancy in processing. Each computing unit 112, 114	 data concentrators may also provide sensor validity monitor-
suitably includes one or more processing devices capable of
	
ing to ensure that the sensors remain active. Each of the
executing multiple and/or simultaneous software processes. 	 sensors may optionally include rapid recovery elements if
As shown, the computing units 112 and 114 can include 	 available and desired for the particular implementation.
real-time multi-tasking computing platforms such as a pri- 50	 The control system 100 can be suitably implemented, for
mary flight control computer (PFCC). The PFCC can be an 	 example, as part of a digital flight control system to provide
integrated modular computing platform (IMCP) with dual 	 functions for the safe flight and landing of aerospace vehicles.
computational lanes.	 The control system 100 provides for independent recovery of
The computing units 112 and 114 provide input process- 	 any computing lane, and all system elements can be executed
ing, sensor selection, control laws (e.g., pitch, yaw, and roll 55 asynchronously. Also, control system 100 can accommodate
inner loops), monitoring (e.g., actuator and surface position	 the asynchronous operation of dissimilar computational
monitoring), equalization, rapid recovery, redundancy man- 	 redundancy. For example, the PFCC performs equalization of
agement, and any appropriate recovery triggers. Although 	 surface positions by bringing diverging data back to the same
control system 100 is shown with two computing units, addi- 	 value or close to the same value. An actuator command man-
tional computing units can be employed if desired.	 6o agement voting algorithm accommodates asynchronous sur-
Each of the computing units 112 and 114 are in operative 	 face command inputs such that the PFCC, ACU, and other
communication with a multitude of actuator control units	 elements can execute asynchronously, and can accommodate
(ACUs) 116, 118, 120, and 122, which provide for actuator	 computational lanes using dissimilar computational redun-
command (Cmd) management and have dual computing	 dancy.
lanes. The ACUs perform command blending and selection, 65 The computing platform such as the PFCC provides a
and use other redundant actuator command values while a 	 real-time multi-tasking computer system with rollback recov-
computing platform such as a PFCC lane is recovering. The 	 ery capability. The PFCC enables integration of functions,
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and applications may selectively use the recovery function as	 recovery state may be suspended or "masked" to allow the
required. The recovery mechanism operation can be verifi-	 processing unit to recover. Once the processing unit has sta-
able using common built-in-test methods, which can be used
	
bilized from the recovery cycle, it may be subjected to the
to verify operation of the recovery mechanism at any time.	 previous tolerances. If the output does not come within tol-
The PFCC can also provide monitoring of ACU surface com- 5 erance within the predetermined time, another request to
mands and surface positions. 	 place the processing unit into a rapid recovery state may be
During operation of control system 100, computing units	 issued.
112,114 receive input from sensor sets 150,152,154 via data 	 In general, if the output of a recovered element falls outside
concentrators 156, 158, 160. Each computing unit provides	 of the relaxed tolerance following recovery, that computa-
the appropriate data to each computational lane thereof, io tional element is kept off-line until the system is restarted
which operate as separate partitioned processing units. 	 (i.e., re-powered). Such a failure indicates that the recovery
Accordingly, each data set from redundant sensor and com- 	 was unsuccessful. While rare, this provides a means for
mand data sets can be simultaneously processed in multiple	 excluding a computational element that does not return to the
isolated processing units. The commands signals from each 	 tolerance within a specified time period. The tolerance used
lane of computing units 112, 114 propagate to each of the 15 following recovery is tightened over a specific time period
ACUs 116, 118, 120, and 122. The ACUs transmit the com- 	 until it reaches the original tolerance.
mand signals to the smart actuators 124, 126, 128, and 130,	 One technique for computing the blended control output
which then perform the requested commands as appropriate 	 involves computing a "mid-value" in which the signals from
to control the hydraulic actuators 132, 134, 136, 138, and	 a processing unit are used to compute a mean and/or median
thereby the control effectors 140-143. During normal opera- 20 of all of the values produced. This mid-valve is then compared
tion, the output signals from each processing unit can be 	 to each signal from each of the processing units in the system.
monitored internally, or externally by the ACUs, to ensure	 If a discrepancy exists between any particular value produced
that each of the computing units 112, 114 are producing	 by any lane and the mean and/or median of all the values (i.e.,
results within a predetermined tolerance of the remaining	 the mid-values), an error condition is detected to exist the
computing units.	 25 appropriate processing unit initiates a rapid recovery cycle.
Each processing unit of computing units 112, 114 is con-	 The discrepancy from the mid-values may be based upon any
figured to be capable of rapid recovery from soft faults. To 	 tolerance value, which can in turn be adjusted based upon
accomplish rapid recovery, each processing unit is configured
	
desired conditions. The detection of discrepancy from a mean
to retrieve control and logic state variable data from internal 	 or median value can be processed very rapidly, thus poten-
memory locations such as a high integrity random access 30 tially resulting in an identification of an error within one or
memory. Using the retrieved state variables and appropriate 	 two computational frames of the value being produced.
sensor data, each processing unit can fully recover from a soft 	 Accordingly, differences from mid-values may be computed
fault relatively quickly without requiring a data transfusion 	 based uponprevious mid-values (i.e., values maintained from
from another computing unit. The rapid recovery cycle 	 a previous frame), or can be computed in real time as appro-
involves halting processor execution, instating state variables 35 priate.
from a protected memory area, and starting execution again at 	 Alternatively, when one or more of the ACUs 116, 118,
an appropriate location in the program execution cycle. 	 120, 122 sense that one of the computing units 112, 114 are
Through the use of command blending, equalization, or other	 not supplying signals that lie within certain tolerances, the
techniques, it is not necessary to synchronize with the remain- 	 ACUs may transmit a signal to the computing unit in question
ing processing units when initiating the rapid recovery cycle. 40 to request the start of a rapid recovery cycle for a particular
A suitable fault recovery system that can be used in the	 processing unit. The computing units of the control system
control system of the present invention is disclosed in 	 are configured to perform redundancy management actions
copending U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/058,764 filed 	 such as equalization, in which the control signal generated by
on Feb. 16, 2005, which is incorporated herein by reference. 	 each processing unit is driven toward fine adjustments in the
During a rapid recovery cycle, the tolerance used in an 45 computed mid-value, so that the signals produced by each
ACU to determine if a processing unit is operating properly 	 processing unit result in an equalized control command. Such
may be relaxed for that particular processing unit. For 	 implementations typically do not require tight synchroniza-
example, during normal operation, there may be a predeter- 	 tion between the various processing units to achieve "equal-
mined tolerance, within which each of the processing units is 	 ized" command values because each command signal is
expected to operate. If a processing unit produces values that 5o driven toward the other signals (i.e., toward a mid-value).
are not within the predetermined tolerance, that processing	 An equalization signal is derived from feedback of control
unit may be determined to be suffering from a soft fault, and 	 effector positions and is used to cancel out drift in the surface
a rapid recovery cycle may be initiated. During the rapid	 commands, preventing divergence of computed surface com-
recovery cycle, the predetermined tolerance for the affected 	 mands. This allows tight monitoring and comparison of the
processing unit may be initially widened and then narrowed 55 command signals in the ACU and the rapid detection of
over a predetermined time period such that further deviations 	 computing element errors in time to command recovery
are acceptable until the processing unit resumes normal
	
before state variable values are permanently lost.
operation.	 Use of the equalization method allows asynchronism of the
Furthermore, the output of the processing unit may not be 	 control computation elements so that the implementation of
included in the derivation of the output from the ACU (e.g., 60 the elements may be either similar or dissimilar as called for
computation of the mid-value) until the output comes within 	 in order to meet reliability and availability requirements. For
the relaxed tolerance. If the output comes within tolerance	 example, different types of processors may be employed in
(indicating that the computing unit has stabilized) within a 	 the computing units if desired. The equalization scheme also
predetermined period of time, it may once again be included 	 accommodates errant surface positions
in the output derivation. Before the predetermined time has 65	 By implementing mid-value signal selection and equaliza-
expired and the processing unit output has come within tol-	 tion, rapid recovery of redundant elements is provided for in
erance, requests for placing the processing unit into a rapid 	 a transparent, seamless way. That is, any data errors in any
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processing unit do not propagate through the system to 	 value is sent to a debounce module 430 for validation. An
adversely affect the control function. If one processing unit 	 invalid control status value is sent to an OR logic module 434,
encounters a soft fault and proceeds to a recovery cycle, the 	 resulting in a servo fault 440 being reported. In a second
remaining operating processing units are unaffected by the 	 monitoring lane, a servo surface position 450 and a servo
recovery cycle and the operation of the control system as a 5 surface command 452 are sent to a position/command com-
whole is unaffected. Because the error is very quickly con- 	 pare module 460 for comparison. If the servo surface position
fined, recovery of redundant control commands can be pro- 	 450 and servo surface command 452 have a difference that
cessed very rapidly.	 exceeds a predetermined servo compare limit 470, a signal is
As discussed previously, the monitoring system of the 	 sent to OR logic module 434, resulting in a servo fault 440
invention generally comprises two independent monitoring io being reported.
planes within a control system. The first monitoring plane is	 FIG. 5 illustrates an exemplary ACU monitor 500 that can
internal to the computing units in the control system. For 	 be used in a reasonableness monitor. The monitor 500 per-
example, the first monitoring plane can be implemented in 	 forms monitoring of computing elements in a pre-recovery
computing units 112, 114 of control system 100. The second	 trigger mode, with variable tolerance not being applied at this
monitoring plane is external to the computing units in the 15 point. During operation of monitor 500, each ACU input in
control system, and can be implemented in the ACUs of 	 each control axis is monitored by each computing unit such as
control system 100.	 an FCC. An ACU voted surface command 510 is sent to a
The internal first monitoring plane includes two in-line 	 fresh test module 520 to determine its freshness. If the ACU
monitors. The first internal monitor is a self-checking, lock-	 voted surface command is not fresh, it is flagged as ail ACU
step-processing platform with integrated rapid recovery 20 stale fault 524 and is excluded from further monitoring. A
capability. The first monitor triggers a recovery mechanism 	 fresh ACU voted surface command 524 is sent to a voted
on a lane miscompare or a lockstep fault, and may be readily 	 command/surface command compare module 530 for com-
integrated with existing state of the art monitoring methods 	 parison with a surface computation 540. If the difference
implemented in either hardware or software (e.g., error detec-	 between ACU voted surface command 524 and surface com-
tion and correction (EDC) codes, parity, and others). 	 25 putation 540 exceeds a predetermined surface command
The second internal monitor of the first monitoring plane	 compare limit 550, an ACU fault 560 is asserted.
includes reasonableness monitors, which compare actual sur- 	 As discussed previously, the external second monitoring
face positions with commanded surface positions. Such 	 plane includes two monitors on ACUs. The first external
monitors can include time magnitude monitoring; servo 	 monitor includes a pre-recovery computing monitor, and the
monitoring in which a servo monitor compares effector com- 30 second external monitor includes a post recovery computing
mands with effector positions and isolates faults to actuator/ 	 monitor.
servo devices; and ACU monitoring, in which an ACU moni- 	 In the pre-recovery computing monitor, multiple command
tor compares effector command computations by a computer 	 computations are independently monitored across multiple
with ACU blended effector commands, and isolates faults to 	 redundant computing units. Fresh and valid commands are
an ACU. A built-in test of recovery mechanism can also be 35 combined to form a blended command. Each input is com-
provided, in which a simulated soft fault triggers a recovery 	 pared with the blended command and a rapid recovery of
mechanism, followed by the test recovery memory contents 	 errant computational elements is triggered within a comput-
being compared to known test values. This verifies that the	 ing unit when the difference between the blended command
recovery mechanism is fully operational.	 and a command computation is outside a predetermined
FIG. 2 is a block diagram of an exemplary time magnitude 40 monitor window limit. A computational element that is com-
monitor 200 that can be used in a reasonableness monitor.	 manded to recover is excluded from pre-recovery monitoring
During operation of monitor 200, a processing unit of the	 until it is restored.
control system performs a control law computation 210 and 	 FIG. 3 shows an exemplary actuator command selection
sends a computed surface command to a compare module 220 	 and x-lane command monitor 300 that can be used in the
for comparison with an ACU(1) blended command. A smart 45 pre-recovery computing monitor. The monitor 300 includes a
actuator is commanded to ignore the ACU(1) blended com- 	 command error monitor 320 and a mid-value selection mod-
mand when deviations between the ACU(1) blended com-	 ule 340. During operation of monitor 300, actuator command
mand output and the computed surface command are beyond 	 values are received by mid-value selection module 340 from
an established limit for a specified time 224. The ACU 	 actuator command lanes 1, 2, 3.... n, which also send the
blended actuator commands forACU(1), ACU(2) ... ACU(n) 50 command values to command error lanes 1, 2, 3.... n that
are sent to a select module 230, and the selected command is 	 communicate with command monitor 320. The mid-value
sent to a compare module 240 for comparison with a surface 	 selection module 340 includes temporary or permanent de-
position feedback signal. When deviations between the 	 selection of an actuator command lane based on CPM recov-
selected command output and the surface position feedback 	 ery (health) status/history. A selected mid-value actuator
signal exceed an established limit for a specified time 250, the 55 command 350 is sent to a smart actuator 370 that operatively
actuator is commanded to shutdown. 	 communicates with a control surface 380. The selected mid-
FIG. 4 depicts an exemplary servo monitor 400 that can be	 value command 350 is also sent to command error lanes 1, 2,
used in a reasonableness monitor to isolate faults to either a 	 3 ... n for command monitoring by monitor 320. The com-
servo/actuator or an ACU. This monitor is not limited to 	 mand error monitor 320 is initially widened for a specific
monitoring ACUs or surface servos/actuators, but can apply 60 CPM following a recovery trigger and narrows over a specific
to a variety of control system implementations. During opera-	 time window until the tolerance reaches the pre-recovery
tion of monitor 400, each computing unit such as an FCC	 value. The command monitor also flags a command miscom-
monitors each servo input for each control axis. In a first	 pare to a CPM when an error is detected. The logic of monitor
monitoring lane, an ACU status value 410 is sent to a fresh test 	 300 can be replicated for each control surface.
module 420 to determine its freshness. If the ACU status 65	 FIG. 6 depicts an exemplary ACU pre-recovery monitor
value is not fresh, it is flagged as an ACU stale fault 424 and	 600 that can be used in the pre-recovery computing monitor.
is excluded from further monitoring. A fresh ACU status 	 During operation, a surface command value 610 is sent to a
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fresh test module 620 to determine its freshness. A fresh
current surface command 624 is sent to a recovery monitor
630 and compared with an ACU voted surface command 640
and a current surface command state 644. A recovery trigger
650 is generated if the difference between current surface
command 624, voted surface command 640, and current sur-
face command state 644 exceeds a normal recovery monitor
limit 660. Thereafter, a next surface command state 670 is set
to recovery. The computer elements that are commanded to
recover are excluded from recovery monitoring until restored.
When the difference between a current surface command
624, a voted surface command 640, and current surface com-
mand state 644 remains within the normal recovery monitor
limit 660, a next surface command state 670 remains in a
normal state and no recovery trigger is generated.
The post recovery computing monitor in the second exter-
nal monitoring platform monitors the integrity of a previously
recovered computational element that has been gracefully
restored within a redundant control unit. After recovery, the
recovered computational element is monitored using a vari-
able time magnitude monitor, in which a recovery monitor
window is extended or widened for recovering computer
surface command inputs following an external recovery trig-
ger. The recovery monitor window narrows with time until it
reaches the initial surface command monitor window limit.
This allows a recovered computational element to gracefully
return to a viable state (fresh and reasonable) in a mid-value
computation. An input value from the recovered computa-
tional element is restored to a viable state and included in the
mid-value vote if the difference between the input value and
the mid-value remains within the widened monitoring win-
dow for the allocated recovery time. If the input value from
the recovered computational element falls outside the wid-
ened monitor window, the input value is discarded until a
system restart or power cycle.
For example, FIG. 7 illustrates a post recovery computing
monitor 700. During operation, each ACU monitors each
computer surface command value in an ACU axis. A surface
command value 710 is sent to a fresh test module 720 to
determine its freshness. Afresh current surface command 724
is sent to a recovery monitor 730 and compared with an ACU
voted surface command 740 and a current surface command
state 744. The surface command values in the recover state, as
indicated by current surface command state 744 are moni-
tored by recovery monitor 730. An extended recovery moni-
tor limit 750 is determined by adding an offset to the normal
recovery monitor limit 760, and the offset is reduced as a
surface command recovery timer 764 expires. A next surface
command state 770 remains in a recover state while the dif-
ference between current surface command 724 and voted
surface command 740 does not exceed the extended recovery
monitor limit 750 and surface command recovery timer 764
has not expired. The next surface command state 770 is dis-
abled if the difference between current surface command 724
and voted surface command 740 exceeds the extended recov-
ery monitor limit 750. The next surface command state 770 is
set to normal if the difference between current surface com-
mand 724 and voted surface command 740 remains less than
the extended recovery monitor limit 750 for the duration of
the surface command recovery timer 764. This allows current
surface command value 724 to be reintroduced into the voted
surface command computation.
The post recovery computer monitor can be invoked in an
ACU to monitor a PFCC following a recovery of a PFCC
triggered by the ACU. The PFCC outputs may be included in
the ACU servo command computation if the outputs of the
previously recovered PFCC fall within an acceptable range
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when compared to the voted or averaged value of the healthy
PFCCs within the system. The recovered PFCC may be dis-
abled for the duration of the mission if the post recovery
commands do not fall within the acceptable range within a
s specified time period. The ACU either puts the recovered
PFCC back into use after a recovery is triggered or excludes
computations from the PFCC until the next system restart.
In general, the monitoring techniques of the invention are
scalable, as there is no dependency on sorting, voting, or
io monitoring algorithms that would exclude a greater number
of computational elements from being monitored. The moni-
toring techniques are also asynchronous and independent of
surface command computations within a control system such
as a primary flight control system. The monitoring techniques
15 are also independent of servo and actuator redundancy man-
agement. Thus, the actuator controller is not required to be
controlling the actuator for the monitoring methods to be
active and functional.
The blended surface command computation, monitoring,
20 and output to a servo/actuator occur in a single computational
frame. Thus, prior inputs are not required. In addition, the
recovery of a computational element is selective depending
upon which computation is in error. The time magnitude
monitoring method can be used to gracefully restore a previ-
25 ously recovered computational element to the original system
configuration. The monitoring methods aid in computational
element fault isolation to both the actuator control unit and a
servo/actuator system driven by the actuator control unit.
When used in a flight control system, the present monitor-
30 ing methods ensure that the pilot is always connected to
control surfaces through a computer, and therefore no backup
direct connection is required to ensure safe flight and landing
of the aircraft. The monitoring methods allow multiple asyn-
chronous command channels to control and monitor each
35 individual aircraft surface.
The present monitoring methods detect a single errant
computation and trigger a computer recovery within a single
computational frame. The monitoring methods also monitor
the recovery process and will restore a redundant element if
40 the errant element successfully recovers. The monitoring
techniques work in the presence of soft faults in the control
system architectural elements and improve the mean time
between unscheduled removals (MTBUR), moving it toward
the mean time between failure (MTBF).
45 The present invention may be embodied in other specific
forms without departing from its essential characteristics.
The described embodiments and methods are to be consid-
ered in all respects only as illustrative and not restrictive. The
scope of the invention is therefore indicated by the appended
50 claims rather than by the foregoing description. All changes
that come within the meaning and range of equivalency of the
claims are to be embraced within their scope.
What is claimed is:
55	 1. A monitoring system for a recoverable digital control
system, the monitoring system comprising:
• first monitoring plane internal to one or more computing
units in the control system, the first monitoring plane
comprising:
60 a first internal monitor comprising a self-checking, lock-
step-processing monitor with integrated rapid recov-
ery capability; and
a second internal monitor comprising one or more rea-
sonableness monitors that compare an actual effector
65	 position with a commanded effector position; and
• second monitoring plane external to the computing units,
the second monitoring plane comprising:
US 7,765,427 B2
13
a first external monitor comprising a pre-recovery com-
puting monitor; and
a second external monitor comprising a post recovery
computing monitor;
wherein the first external monitor is configured to indepen-
dently monitor multiple effector position command
computations across the computing units;
wherein the first external monitor is configured to sort fresh
and valid input commands from the computing units by
magnitude, and compute a blended command by aver-
aging two sorted input commands closest to a median of
all the input commands while discarding outlying input
commands from the blended command computation;
and
wherein the computing units provide a real-time integrated
modular computing platform.
2. The monitoring system of claim 1, wherein the one or
more reasonableness monitors comprise a time magnitude
monitor that is configured to compare a blended command
with a computed command.
3. The monitoring system of claim 1, wherein the one or
more reasonableness monitors comprise a servo monitor that
is configured to compare effector commands with effector
positions, and isolate any fault to a servo or an actuator
control unit.
4. The monitoring system of claim 3, wherein the fault
comprises a soft fault.
5. The monitoring system of claim 1, wherein the one or
more reasonableness monitors comprise an actuator control
unit monitor that is configured to compare command compu-
tations of a computing unit with actuator control unit com-
mands, and isolate any fault to an actuator control unit.
6. The monitoring system of claim 5, wherein the fault
comprises a soft fault.
7. The monitoring system of claim 1, wherein the first
external monitor is configured to compare each input com-
mand with the blended command and trigger a rapid recovery
of an errant computational element within a computing unit
when the difference between the input command and the
blended command is outside of a predetermined monitor
window limit.
8. The monitoring system of claim 1, wherein the second
external monitor is configured to monitor the integrity of a
previously recovered computational element.
9. The monitoring system of claim 8, wherein the second
external monitor is configured for monitoring a recovered
computational element using a variable time magnitude
monitor and an extended monitor window limit, wherein the
extended monitor window limit narrows with time.
10. The monitoring system of claim 9, wherein the second
external monitor is configured to allow the recovered compu-
tational element to return to a viable state in a blended com-
mand computation if a difference between an input command
from the recovered computational element and a blended
command remains within the extended monitor window limit
for an allocated recovery time.
11. The monitoring system of claim 9, wherein the second
external monitor is configured to discard any input command
from the recovered computational element that falls outside
the extended monitor window limit until a system restart or
power cycle.
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12. The monitoring system of claim 1, wherein the second
monitoring plane is implemented in one or more actuator
control units.
13. The monitoring system of claim 12, wherein the one or
5 more actuator control units are in operative communication
with one or more smart actuators.
14. The monitoring system of claim 13, wherein the one or
more smart actuators are in operative communication with
one or more actuator or servo devices.
10 15. The monitoring system of claim 14, wherein the actua-
tor or servo devices are each operatively connected to one or
more control effectors.
16. A method for independently monitoring multiple com-
mand computations across multiple redundant computing
15 units, the method comprising:
sorting fresh and valid effector position commands from
the computing units by magnitude;
computing a blended command by averaging two sorted
input commands closest to a median of all the input
20	 commands;
discarding any outlying input commands from the blended
command computation;
comparing each input command from a computational ele-
ment of a computing unit with the blended command;
25	 and
triggering a rapid recovery of any errant computational
element when a difference between the blended com-
mand and an effector position command computation is
outside a predetermined window limit.
30	 17. The method of claim 16, further comprising:
monitoring integrity of a previously recovered computa-
tional element by a method comprising:
monitoring the recovered computational element using a
variable time magnitude monitor in which an
35	 extended monitor window narrows with time;
allowing the recovered computational element to return
to a viable state in a blended command computation if
a difference between an input command from the
computational element and a blended command
40	 remains within the extended monitor window for an
allocated recovery time; and
discarding an input command from the recovered com-
putational element if the input command falls outside
of the extended monitor window until a system restart
45	 or power cycle.
18. A method for time magnitude monitoring comprising:
comparing a blended command output with a computed
effector command, wherein the blended command out-
put is computed by averaging two sorted input com-
50	 mands closest to a median of all the input commands;
disregarding the blended command output when devia-
tions between the blended command output and the
computed effector command exceed an established limit
for a specified time;
55	 selecting a blended command output from a plurality of
blended command outputs;
comparing the selected blended command output with an
effector position feedback signal; and
initiating an actuator shutdown command when deviations
60	 between the selected blended command output and the
effector position feedback signal exceed an established
limit for a specified time.
